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Abstract 
A firm energy market for Colombia is presented. Firm energy—the ability to provide 
energy in a dry period—is the product needed for reliability in Colombia’s hydro-
dominated electricity market. The firm energy market coordinates investment in new 
resources to assure that sufficient firm energy is available in dry periods. Load procures 
in an annual auction enough firm energy to cover its needs. The firm energy product 
includes both a financial call option and the physical capability to supply firm energy. 
The call option protects load from high spot prices and improves the performance of the 
spot market during scarcity. The market provides strong performance incentives 
through the spot energy price. Market power is addressed directly: existing resources 
cannot impact the firm energy price. Since load is hedged from high spot prices, the 
market can rely on high prices to balance supply and demand during dry periods, rather 
than rationing. 
1 Summary 
This paper presents a market design for the Colombia firm energy market, which began on a 
transitional basis in December 2006 with an initial auction scheduled in November 2007. 
A fundamental characteristic of the Colombian electricity market is that it is hydro-
dominated. Roughly 80% of Colombia’s energy is produced from hydro resources, and about 
two-thirds of its capacity is hydro. As a result, the reliability adequacy constraint in Colombia is 
having sufficient thermal resources and hydro reservoirs to provide firm energy during a dry 
period. The proposed firm energy market provides the investment and operating incentives for 
suppliers to build and operate the efficient quantity and quality of energy resources. The market 
both reduces supplier risk and improves reliability, resulting in reliable electricity at minimum 
cost to consumers. 
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The market has a number of key features outlined below. 
1. Product. The firm energy product is a financial call option backed by a physical resource 
certified as capable of producing firm energy during a dry period. The physical 
requirement guarantees that sufficient resources will be available to produce firm energy. 
The financial call option hedges load from high energy prices during periods of scarcity.3 
The supplier’s generating units and fuel provide a physical hedge to limit the risk of 
selling the call option. Indeed, relative to an energy-only market, the supplier’s risk is 
reduced, since the firm energy market substitutes highly variable energy rents with a 
constant firm energy payment. The obligation is load following in aggregate: in each hour 
the total obligation is equal to load. A supplier’s obligation in any day is equal to its share 
of firm energy. The obligation is distributed over the day based on the hourly dispatch. 
This definition—tying a unit’s obligation to its hourly dispatch during scarcity—reduces 
market power and improves the performance of the spot energy market. A baseload unit’s 
obligation is spread throughout the day; a hydro unit with high opportunity cost has its 
obligation concentrated on the peak hours of the day. 
2. Planning period. Initially, the planning period—the time between the primary auction 
and the beginning of the supplier’s commitment—is 3 years, but this will increase by six 
months in each successive auction, until it reaches its permanent value of 4 years. 
Projects with even longer lead times can sell firm energy as a price-taker up to 7 years 
ahead. 
3. Commitment period. The commitment period for existing resources is one year. The 
commitment period for new resources is between one and twenty years. New resources 
select their preferred commitment length during the auction qualification. The firm 
energy price is adjusted for inflation during the commitment period. 
4. Cost of new entry. A parameter in the auction is CONE, the cost of new entry. Initially, 
CONE is estimated by the regulator. Subsequently, CONE is adjusted based on 
competitive auction results. 
5. Demand curve. The demand curve specifies how the purchased quantity of firm energy 
depends upon price. At CONE, load purchases its firm energy target (100% of estimated 
firm energy demand). At higher prices, load purchases slightly less than the target 
quantity; at lower prices load purchases slightly more than the target quantity. The firm 
energy price has a ceiling of two times CONE and a floor of one-half times CONE. 
6. Descending clock auction. The auction uses a dynamic auction design intended to 
promote price discovery. The price starts at a high price (two times CONE) and suppliers 
bid the quantity they are willing to supply at that price. If there is excess supply, the price 
is reduced and again suppliers respond with their willingness to supply. This process 
continues until supply and demand balance, which determines the quantity won by each 
supplier and the clearing price paid to all suppliers during the commitment period. 
7. Price formation. The clock auction includes a simple activity rule: as the price declines 
suppliers can maintain or reduce quantities; quantities cannot increase. Thus, a supplier’s 
                                                 
3 Many papers have suggested the use of call options. See Bidwell (2005), Carlos et al. (2002), Chao and Wilson 
(2004), Cramton and Stoft (2006), and Oren (2005). 
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offers must be consistent with an upward sloping supply curve. In addition, there is a rule 
that prevents existing suppliers from exercising market power. Existing resources can opt 
out of the market, but this choice does not impact the firm energy price paid to existing 
resources.  
8. Performance incentives. Performance incentives largely come from the energy spot price. 
Those that supply more than their share during scarcity periods are rewarded and those 
that supply less are penalized. In each case, the marginal incentive comes from the energy 
spot price. In addition, a supplier’s certification of firm energy depends on its estimated 
ability to supply firm energy in a dry period. This estimate depends at least in part on 
historical performance, and this provides an additional incentive. 
9. Fail-safe mechanism. The auction design recognizes the possibility that there may be 
either inadequate supply or insufficient competition. The fail-safe mechanism specifies 
what happens in these unlikely events. 
10. Secondary market. Shortly after the primary auction, a reconfiguration auction is held for 
each commitment year that has not yet occurred, but for which firm energy has already 
been procured in an earlier primary auction. These reconfiguration auctions allow 
suppliers and load to balance their positions in light of improved information. For 
example, a project may proceed faster or slower than anticipated, and load growth may be 
faster or slower than expected. In addition, a monthly auction is held during the 
commitment year to further balance positions. All these auctions are sealed-bid clearing-
price auctions. 
11. Transition. The firm energy price is set administratively in each of the first four years 
(2007 – 2010). During this period, the product includes the hedge for load. Beginning in 
2011, the firm energy price is set in a competitive auction. The first auction is to be held 
in November 2007 for the 2011 commitment year. To reduce risk in early auctions when 
the planning period is shorter, the firm energy payment for existing resources has a 
tighter floor and ceiling. The floor decreases and the ceiling increases for existing 
resources following each of the first three competitive auctions. 
These features work together to produce firm energy payments that will motivate efficient 
(least-cost) investment in generation resources. A critical assumption of the approach is that the 
market for new entry is competitive. Thus, as part of the market implementation, it is important 
for regulators to take steps to reduce barriers to entry. A second critical assumption is that 
suppliers have faith that the market, once implemented, will endure for the lifetime of new 
plants. Hence, it is important for the government to make a commitment to the approach and to 
honor the commitment. Entry barriers and political risk can undermine even the best market 
designs. The regulators and government must recognize and address these challenges, otherwise 
the market could provide high-cost, not least-cost, investment.  
2 Introduction 
This paper presents an auction design for the Colombia firm energy market. Colombia’s 
electricity market is hydro-dominated, with about 80% of its energy coming from hydro 
resources and about two-thirds of its capacity. As a result, the adequacy component of 
Colombia’s reliability constraint must assure that the system has sufficient energy during dry 
periods. This is accomplished by having the right blend of thermal resources together with 
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sufficient reservoir capacity to meet Colombia’s energy demand during a dry period. The 
purpose of the electricity firm energy market is to provide market-based incentives for suppliers 
to invest in the efficient mix of energy resources and then to operate these resources efficiently. 
The firm energy market is needed both to reduce investment risk and to improve the performance 
of the energy spot market. In this way, the firm energy market improves the reliability and 
efficiency of the electricity market. Consumers benefit from reliable electricity at minimum cost; 
suppliers benefit from market incentives and reduced risk. 
The firm energy auction is a forward market for firm energy. Firm energy is the ability to 
deliver energy in periods of scarcity, such as during a dry period. The auction is conducted three 
to four years in advance of the commitment period. This allows new entrants to compete for 
supply, making the firm energy market contestable. Moreover, the auction coordinates the entry 
of new resources so as to avoid the pronounced boom-bust cycle common in most markets. The 
auction allows new resources to lock-in a firm energy price for up to twenty years. Existing 
resources receive the price set by new entry each year. All resources, both new and existing, are 
paid the same firm energy price, except in unusual circumstances. Moreover, this price is the 
same for all locations and for all types of resources. 
The auction uses a descending clock format. The price starts at a high price, approximately 
twice the cost of new entry. Suppliers respond with the quantity each is willing to supply at that 
price. If there is excess supply, the price is reduced and the suppliers again specify the quantity 
desired at the lower price. This process continues until a price is reached in which supply and 
demand are balanced. This defines the clearing price, which is paid to all winning bidders 
throughout their commitment periods.  
The quantity of firm energy demanded increases slightly as the price falls. Additional firm 
energy beyond the target has value for consumers, but this marginal value declines fairly rapidly. 
The demand curve has both a price ceiling and a price floor. The price ceiling at two times the 
cost of new entry (CONE) reflects the fact that entry at high prices is not limited by the price 
incentive, but rather other non-price constraints. The price floor at one-half CONE is intended to 
prevent the firm energy price from falling too low in times of surplus. This provides stability to 
the firm energy price, which reduces supplier risk and thus reduces consumer cost. 
The descending clock auction includes important price formation features. First, to promote 
price discovery, there is an activity rule that requires each supplier’s offers to be consistent with 
an upward-sloping supply curve; that is, as the price declines a supplier can only maintain or 
decrease its supply. Second, to prevent the exercise of market power by existing suppliers, 
existing supply can opt out of the market, but this choice is not allowed to impact the price paid 
to existing suppliers. 
Performance incentives are provided primarily from the spot energy price. The firm energy 
product is a call option together with the physical means to produce firm energy. The total 
quantity of the call option follows load. The obligation is distributed over the day based on the 
hourly dispatch. To the extent that the supplier provides more than its obligation, it is rewarded 
by the spot energy price; to the extent it supplies less than its obligation, it loses the energy price, 
just like in a contract for differences. Hence it has exactly the same incentives as if it had not 
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sold a hedge.4 If the supplier is able to shift its output to higher-priced hours, it will be rewarded. 
Because such shifting is rewarded, the option has no effect on performance incentives, but acts 
only to hedge load and suppliers. Performance incentives come from the spot energy price, as 
they should, and are not affected by the hedge. 
An advantage of the hedge is that it eliminates the incentive to exercise market power during 
times of scarcity. This is because suppliers have effectively sold forward energy covering 100% 
of load during times of scarcity. The forward sale improves the performance of the spot energy 
market during the scarcity periods, which is exactly when the market is most vulnerable to 
market power. Additionally, the hedge reduces supplier risk by removing the energy rents above 
the scarcity price, which tend to have high variance, and including them in the firm energy 
payment, which does not vary with weather or other factors outside of the supplier’s control. 
The scarcity price is a heat rate times a gas index plus other (non-fuel) variable costs. For 
other variable costs we use $15.20/MWh. The gas index is the New York Harbor residual fuel oil 
index, averaged over the prior month, and the heat rate is 12.482 MBTU/MWh, above the heat 
rate of all gas units. During the transition period the scarcity price is $100/MWh. 
The auction design includes fail-safe mechanisms that determine what happens in the 
unlikely event that there is inadequate supply offered in the auction, or there is insufficient 
competition. 
The auction design facilitates an active secondary market. Although the primary auction is 
intended to procure all or nearly all of the target quantity, the purchase occurs several years in 
advance and circumstances may change. Thus, on an annual basis reconfiguration auctions are 
held, so that suppliers and demanders can balance their positions for each commitment year that 
has yet to occur. The reconfiguration auction is a sealed-bid clearing-price auction. Sellers 
submit offers and buyers submit bids, and a uniform clearing-price is determined. Trades can 
also occur during the year in a monthly sealed-bid clearing-price auction. Although the monthly 
market is likely to be extremely thin, this is not a problem, since only a small volume will be 
traded at the monthly price, and in any event the monthly price has both a floor and a ceiling as 
given by the demand curve. Bilateral trades are also supported. 
Finally, the proposal includes a transition period from 2007 to 2010. Firm energy payments 
in these years are set administratively. Nonetheless, the product in the transition years includes 
the hedge at the scarcity price. 
The paper is structured as follows. First we state the purpose of the firm energy market, and 
explain the motivation for forward procurement. Next we describe the key features of the market. 
We define the product, discuss the auction mechanics, and describe how price formation and 
performance incentives are handled. The paper concludes by addressing some of the common 
misunderstandings about the market. 
                                                 
4 Note that if the supplier is short 1 MW it must pay load the spot price minus the scarcity price, whereas if it is not 
short, it must still pay load this same amount but it receives the spot price. Hence the loss from being short is the full 
spot price and not the difference. 
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3 Purpose of the market 
The firm energy market has many purposes. Most importantly it is intended to induce just 
enough investment to maintain adequate resources. In the case of Colombia’s hydro-dominated 
system this means having sufficient thermal generation and hydro reservoirs to provide firm 
energy in a dry period. 
It is not enough, however, to simply have the right quantity of resources. The firm energy 
market should induce the efficient mix of resources, as well as the efficient operation of 
resources.  
The firm energy market should reduce market risk, both for consumers and suppliers. This is 
possible by reducing the volatility of payments through a long-term contract. In particular, much 
of the volatility caused by weather and other short-term market fluctuations can be eliminated 
with the use of a financial call option. The option also improves the performance of the spot 
energy market by mitigating market power during times of energy scarcity. 
The firm energy market must avoid market power in the firm energy auction. Since existing 
suppliers have significant market shares and since the required new entry is typically small 
relative to these shares, the incentive for existing suppliers to exercise market power is great. For 
the firm energy market to send a correct price signal the exercise of market power must be 
avoided. 
The over-arching objective is, of course, to pay no more than necessary for reliable energy. 
This is accomplished automatically when one pursues the other objectives. 
4 Why forward procurement? 
A main feature of the design is that the procurement occurs well in advance of the 
commitment period. This allows new projects compete in advance of entry, before significant 
costs are sunk, which increases competition and produces a meaningful price. It also allows for 
coordinated entry, reducing the cycles of boom followed by bust, which are common in 
electricity markets. 
The coordinated entry reduces the uncertainty in achieving the target level of resources. 
Some over-procurement will occur as a result of the lumpiness of investment and mistaken load 
forecasts, but it is not necessary to deliberately procure extra resources in recognition of 
uncertain entry, as would be necessary with a spot firm energy market. 
A further advantage of forward procurement is that new resources set the firm energy price 
directly; thus, there is less reliance on a demand curve for price setting, less controversy, and less 
price volatility. 
With forward procurement, it is possible to make a long-term commitment for new 
resources. This reduces investor risk and sends a price signal for new investment that is directly 
related to the cost of new entry. 
5 Key features 
We now discuss each of the key features of the market in detail. 
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5.1 Product 
The product definition is essential to the market. Indeed, poor product definition was a main 
source for the failure of earlier firm energy markets. In the case of Colombia, the binding 
reliability constraint is having sufficient firm energy during scarcity events. The main scarcity 
event is seasonal scarcity as the result of depleted hydro reservoirs and low inflows during dry 
periods. Spot scarcity can also occur as a result of outages, but this is unusual. 
Scarcity events are defined by a high spot energy price. The energy price is a transparent 
measure of scarcity. Everyone sees the energy price and participants are used to forecasting the 
energy price. Moreover, a high scarcity price is a reliable measure of scarcity. High scarcity 
prices occur either from scarcity or from an exercise of market power. Given other features of 
the product, which address market power in the spot energy market, the price signal from the 
spot energy market should be an excellent measure of scarcity. 
The product is a firm energy-backed energy option. Firm energy is defined by the energy 
delivery capability in a worst-case benchmark—a dry period. Each resource is certified both for 
its nameplate capacity (maximum output rate), and its firm energy (average energy output rate in 
worst-case benchmark). A typical thermal unit is certified at something close to its nameplate 
capacity, such as 92% of nameplate. The reduction from 100% reflects the units unavailability 
due to outages. In contrast, a hydro resource’s firm energy may be well below its nameplate, say 
35%, due to a limited water reservoir and low inflows during dry periods. 
The scarcity price of the call option is a gas index times a heat rate plus other (non-fuel) 
variable costs. The gas index is the New York Harbor residual fuel oil index, averaged over the 
prior month. This index is currently being used in Colombia and has the advantage that it cannot 
be manipulated by any market participant. For other variable costs we use $15.20/MWh. The 
proposed heat rate is 12.482 MBTU/MWh. This heat rate is higher than the heat rate of existing 
gas thermal units. This means that when the energy price is above the scarcity price, all thermal 
units would like to provide energy. New thermal peakers have heat rates of between 9 and 10 
MBTU/MWh.  
Some have argued for a much higher scarcity price.5 The view is that by providing price 
coverage from high spot prices, we are undermining bilateral contracts for energy. Our view is 
that the incentives for bilateral contracting are still strong, and moreover, the lower scarcity price 
improves the performance of the spot market, and thereby makes negotiating bilateral contracts 
easier. The problem with relying too heavily on bilateral contracts for price coverage is that 
doing so expands market power in the contracting market. A lower scarcity price reduces the 
potential for market power in the market for energy contracts, because it limits threats to exercise 
market power in the spot energy market. 
The firm energy target is the best forecast of energy demand in the commitment year, 
accounting for load growth. This is the quantity of firm energy that is procured when the firm 
energy price equals CONE. The firm energy target for 2010 is shown below as the area under the 
load duration curve, accounting for load growth from the present. 
                                                 




















In this design, there is a single product and a single price. Remarkably, this is all that is 
needed for efficiency. The reason is that in Colombia’s hydro-dominated system, there is a single 
reliability constraint: having sufficient firm energy to cover a dry period. This single constraint 
implies single product and single price. 
If Colombia had a locational spot energy market with locational marginal prices, as in many 
markets in the United States, then it would be desirable to consider a zonal firm energy market, 
where locational constraints are modeled as well, but such considerations are not relevant in a 
system with a non-locational spot energy market. The spot market necessarily has stronger 
locational needs than the forward market, which averages hourly locational impacts across the 
entire commitment period. 
Each new resource is certified for its incremental contribution to the firm energy constraint. 
For thermal units, the certification is updated periodically based on historical performance. 
The product, then, is firm energy plus a mandatory hedge.  
Firm energy is the unit’s expected energy contribution to the system during the worst-case 
benchmark. A new unit’s firm-energy contribution is how much less energy the system would 
have without the unit in the worst-case benchmark.6 The same calculation is made for a hydro or 
fossil resource. The approach is the same for existing units with one exception. For existing 
units, collectively facing a delivery constraint, such as a gas line constraint, the firm energy of 
the constraint is shared proportionally. 
The mandatory hedge is the call option for energy at the scarcity price. The obligation is 
load following in aggregate: in each hour the total obligation is equal to load. A supplier’s 
obligation in any day is equal to its share of firm energy. The obligation is distributed over the 
day based on the hourly dispatch. This definition—tying a unit’s obligation to its hourly dispatch 
during scarcity—reduces market power and improves the performance of the spot energy market. 
                                                 
6 This definition has been designed to remain correct even if high-marginal-cost fossil units eventually find they are 
not required during some off-peak hours during a period of scarcity. 
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A baseload unit’s obligation is spread throughout the day; a hydro unit with high opportunity 
cost has its obligation concentrated on the peak hours of the day. During scarcity hours the hydro 
opportunity cost sets the price and thermal resources run at capacity if available.  
One might think that this approach is biased against hydro resources, since hydro is asked to 
do more load following than the thermal resources. Indeed, there would be a bias if load-
following was scarce; however, since there is a surplus of capacity, the capability is efficiently 
priced at zero. Later we discuss how the market can be adjusted to accommodate scarcity of both 
capacity and firm energy. 
The sale of the hedge does not distort a suppliers incentive to perform. The primary 
incentive is still coming from the spot energy price. Thermal suppliers have an incentive to 
generate as much as possible during scarcity hours, and hydro units have an incentive to produce 
their limited energy in the highest-priced hours. To the extent a hydro supplier can shift its 
output to higher-priced hours, the supplier is rewarded.  
The purchase in the firm energy auction is translated into an obligation for each supplier in 
each day, and each hour based on the hourly dispatch. If less or more than the target is 
purchased, this is reflected in the aggregate supplier obligation. For example, if 99% of the target 
firm energy is purchased, then the aggregate supplier obligation is 99% of load in each hour; 
load is unhedged for 1% of the load that is not purchased. If 101% of the target is purchased, 
then the aggregate supplier obligation is 101% of load in each hour; load is over-hedged by 1%.  
Load’s purchase is based on a forecast of load. There will be deviations between the forecast 
and the actual load. As a result, a true-up at end of each month is done to adjust for deviations 
between the monthly target and actual monthly load. Thus load may purchase in auction 100% of 
its (forecasted) target, but then we observe in the month that actual load is 102% of month’s 
target, then obligations are scaled down by 100/102. Penalties and rewards are calculated on this 
basis. The implication of this adjustment is that the risk from unanticipated load growth is born 
by load, not by suppliers.  
The settlement of the option is just like settling a conditional contract for differences in each 
hour. If the spot price is no more than the scarcity price, then there is no obligation. If the spot 
price is greater than the scarcity price, then we settle differences: 
reward or penalty = (Qsupplied – Qobligation) × (Pspot – Pstrike). 
Just like with a contract for differences, the supplier’s penalty for not meeting its obligation 
is the same as the supplier buying from the spot market to satisfy obligation. Notice too that the 
outcome is the same if it is done on a unit basis or a portfolio basis. Thus, the supplier optimizes 
its portfolio just as it would without the call option. 
5.2 Planning period 
The time between the auction date and the start of commitment is the planning period. We 
propose a planning period of four years. This is far enough ahead of the commitment that 
potential new projects can compete in the auction before substantial costs have been sunk in the 
project. In this way, the bids from new resources can reflect the cost of new entry. It makes the 
firm energy market contestable and allows new entry to set the price. 
This long planning period is essential. Existing resources would set the wrong price because 
of sunk costs and market power. We must rely on new entry to set the price. 
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It should be kept in mind that some pre-auction planning and development must occur for all 
new projects. In particular, the project must be developed to the point that it can be qualified in 
the auction as a credible project. A meaningful qualification requirement is needed to discourage 
speculators from participating in the auction. The auction is only to include credible projects, not 
the wishful thinking of speculators. 
In light of the importance of longer-lead-time hydro projects in Colombia, a four year 
planning period is probably best. However, a shorter planning period can be used in the first two 
auctions as follows: 
1. First auction, November 2007 (2011 commitment): 3 years 
2. Second auction, May 2008 (2012 commitment): 3.5 years 
All later auctions (2013 commitment and beyond) would have a four-year planning period. 
Certainly, some projects, such as a large hydro project cannot be completed in four years. 
These projects may take 6-8 years to complete. For large hydro projects, we allow the investor to 
lock-in the auction price from the 4-year ahead auction up to seven years ahead. The large hydro 
project is a price taker in the auction, since it is not selling firm energy four years head, but up to 
seven years ahead. At the conclusion of the auction, the investor specifies the fraction of the firm 
energy from the project it desires to lock-in at 4-year ahead auction price.  
The total quantity of firm energy purchased by load more than four years ahead is limited by 
a percent of the new firm energy required in that year, based on the planning projections, as 
shown below. 
Years ahead 7 6 5
Percent limit 40% 50% 60%
      Load's Limit on Forward Purchase
 
If these limits are binding, then a maximum percentage for forward sale is imposed. For 
example, if one supplier wants to lock-in 35% and another wants to lock-in 100%, then the lock-
in of the second bidder is reduced from 100% to the point where the percent limit is reached. The 
first bidder’s lock-in is not changed, provided it is not necessary to reduce the second bidder’s 
lock in below 35%. 
This approach allows the large hydro investor to manage risk more effectively by locking-in 
firm energy prices over one or more auctions. Like other investors, the length of commitment, up 
to ten years, is specified at qualification. 
5.3 Commitment period 
The commitment period is the period over which the product is sold and payment is 
received.  
For new resources, the commitment period is up to twenty years. At qualification, the 
supplier specifies the desired commitment period from one to twenty years for each of its new 
projects. A winning supplier locks in the firm energy clearing price for the period it specified. 
The price is adjusted for inflation. The long commitment period lets new resources lock-in a firm 
energy price, reducing risk and encouraging investment. 
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For existing resources, the commitment period is one year. Unlike new resources, existing 
resources do not need a long commitment, since the fixed costs of existing resources are already 
sunk. Indeed, having a short (one year) commitment reduces risk for the supplier, since the 
supplier gets more draws from the price distribution. This also simplifies the supplier’s decision-
making. If there was a multiple-year commitment for existing supply, then the supplier would 
need to make a decision about opting out of the market during a year in which the supplier 
believes the firm energy price would be low relative to future prices. 
5.4 Demand curve 
The demand curve specifies the quantity that is purchased at each price. In theory, it 
represents the marginal value to load of additional firm energy. In practice, it makes sense to 







CONE = Cost of New Entry (marginal unit)
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The demand curve depends on two parameters. The first is the firm energy target discussed 
earlier. The second is CONE, the estimated cost of new entry. CONE is initially set 
administratively based on a study of the cost of a new efficient peaking unit. In subsequent years, 
CONE is updated after every competitive auction (a competitive auction is one with sufficient 
competition as discussed below). In particular, if the auction this year is competitive, then 
CONENext Year = .7 CONEThis Year + .3 Clearing PriceThis Year. 
If the auction has either inadequate supply or insufficient competition, then 
CONENext Year = CONEThis Year. 
The demand curve has a price ceiling of two times CONE. At this price the auction is 
sending the market a strong “build” signal. If sufficient resources do not offer at this price, then 
it is likely that something other than price is restraining entry. Raising the price further, then, 
would simply result in a large wealth transfer to existing resources, rather than an expansion of 
new supply. 
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The demand curve has a price floor of one-half CONE. The motivation for the price floor is 
to stabilize the price during periods of surplus, which may arise from lumpy entry in the prior 
year together with slow growth. The auction in this case is sending a strong “don’t build” signal. 
Letting the price fall even further is not needed to discourage new entry. Rather it would simply 
increase the volatility of prices and therefore supplier risk. The bid of a supplier of a new project 
depends on both the expectation and variation in future firm energy prices. Having a floor on this 
price reduces the bid of the new entrant, because the supplier’s risk is reduced as a result of the 
floor. 
At a price of CONE, load buys exactly its target firm energy. This makes sense, since CONE 
is load’s best estimate of the cost of new entry, load should be willing to pay CONE for its 
target. At higher prices, load buys a little bit less. Similar at lower prices, load buys a little bit 
more. The slope of the demand curve is twice as steep to the left of the target as it is to the right 
of the target. This reflects the fact that the marginal value of firm energy increases more quickly 
when we move below the target than it decreases when we move above the target. That is, near 
CONE the demand curve reflects diminishing marginal value for additional firm energy. The 
exact slopes of the demand curve above and below CONE is determined from the rule that the 
demand curve reaches the price ceiling when load purchases 96% of the target, and reaches the 
price floor when load purchases 104% of the target. This “4% rule” is based on judgment; it will 
be examined further in a simulation study of the market. 
5.5 Descending clock auction 
The auction format is a descending clock. This a dynamic auction with excellent efficiency 
properties due to its robust price discovery. It works as follows. The auctioneer announces a high 
starting price. The suppliers then name quantities they wish to supply at the high price. The 
auctioneer determines the excess supply and announces a lower price. The suppliers again 
respond with quantities. This process continues until there is no longer any excess supply. 
5.5.1 Starting price 
In a descending clock auction, it is important that the starting price be set sufficiently high to 
create significant excess supply. Setting too high a starting price causes little harm, since 
competition among projects will determine the clearing price. The high starting price will 
quickly be bid down. On the other hand, setting too low a starting price destroys the auction. If 
the price is set too low, the auction would begin with either inadequate supply or insufficient 
competition. 
A starting price of two times CONE should be high enough to assure sufficient supply is 
offered. If this price is not high enough, then the problem of supply is likely the result of entry 
barriers or faulty supplier beliefs (suppliers thinking the clearing price will be low when in fact it 
is high). 
5.5.2 Activity rule 
To promote price discovery, the auction has an activity rule that limits what a bidder can do 
later in the auction based on what it did earlier in the auction. In particular, the activity rule 
requires that the bidders bid in a way consistent with an upward sloping supply curve: suppliers 
can only maintain or reduce quantity as the price falls. 
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5.5.3 Intraround bids 
One can easily imagine a clock auction being conducted with a continuous clock. The price 
clock simply ticks down continuously, just like a countdown timer. This may work well if 
communication with bidders were perfect. In practice, however, it makes sense to conduct the 
auction in discrete rounds, both because communication with bidders is imperfect and because a 
bidder may need time to reflect on its bids. For example, in this auction, it may make sense to 
conduct about four rounds per day.  
When a clock auction is conducted with discrete rounds, the best approach is to mimic what 
would happen with a continuous clock. This is done using intraround bids. In each round, the 
auctioneer announces: 1) the excess supply at end of prior round, 2) the start of round price 
(higher price), and 3) the end of round price (lower price). Each bidder submits a supply curve, 
which specifies the quantity the supplier offers at all prices between the start of round price and 
the end of round price. The auctioneer then determines the excess supply at end of round price—
and the process continues—or if there is no excess supply at the end of round price, the 
auctioneer determines the clearing price, and the auction ends. Typically, supply curves are 













Individual Supply Bid, Round 6
 
The supplier in this example is saying that it wishes to supply 400 MW at prices between $7.00 
and $6.63, 300 MW at prices between $6.63 and $6.17, and 175 MW at prices between $6.17 
and $6.00. 
The use of intraround bids enables the bidder to name the prices at which it wishes to reduce 
its quantity. Clock auctions without intraround bids generally only allow bidders to express 
supply at the end of round price in each round. The advantage of intraround bids is that it allows 
the auctioneer to have a significant decrement between rounds without reducing the efficiency of 
the auction. Intraround bids also make ties much less likely, and allow the auctioneer to better 
control the pace of the auction. 





















5.5.4 Information policy 
An auction’s information policy specifies what the bidders know when they place their bids. 
In this auction, the auctioneer announces the demand curve and starting price before auction. 
After every round, the auctioneer reports excess supply at the end of round price, and the end of 
round price for the next round. The next round’s end of round price is determined from the extent 
of excess supply.  
Supply by resource type (hydro, baseload, and peaker) is also reported after every round. For 
this purpose, peaker is defined as a gas unit with a heat rate above 9 MBTU/MWh. This 
information is useful to the bidders, since the profitability of a unit generally depends on the 
distribution of unit types. For example, the presence of one large new hydro project will reduce 
the profitability of a second new hydro project. 
The auctioneer does not report the supply bids of the individual bidders. This kind of 
detailed information is typically not needed for price discovery, but it could be used as part of 
strategies to support tacit collusion. This is the reason the individual information is not reported. 
In contrast, the aggregate information about excess supply is useful because it helps a bidder 
decide questions such as whether it could get two 100 MW units accepted or only one, and 
because of economies of scale, it will want to bid a different price depending on this answer. We 
do not need to know the details of such considerations because there is a general result that 
knowing more about market conditions improves decision making and efficiency. The 
descending clock auction provides such information. 
5.5.5 Lumpy investment 
The auction respects the fact that projects are lumpy. Generating units come in discrete 
lumps. A supplier with a 500 MW new project would be quite upset if it participated in the 
auction and found out that it won in the auction, but it only won 10 MW, not the full 500 MW it 
offered. To avoid this problem, the bidder’s supply curve is interpreted as discrete quantities. For 
example, with the supply curve above the supplier is offering the quantities of 400, 300, and 175; 
other intermediate quantities are not offered. In this way, the supplier need not fear partial 
acceptance. However, the lumps bid by the supplier must correspond to the supplier’s discrete 
physical generating units. 
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5.5.6 Clearing rule 
With lumpy bids, it is generally not possible to have exact market clearing, where supply 
exactly equals demand. The question then is how is the clearing price determined and who are 
the winners. The rule in this auction is straight-forward. The auction is run until there is no 






















1. The shift from excess supply to excess demand occurs on a vertical supply step. In this 
case, we have exact clearing at the price PC. 
2. The shift from excess supply to excess demand occurs on a horizontal supply step. In 
this case, the clearing is not exact. There are two possibilities: (a) clearing occurs on the 
horizontal step that intersects demand, and (b) clearing occurs at a higher step and the 
large lump at the lower step is rejected. Whether (a) or (b) occurs depends on which 
option maximizes net value, which is the area under the demand curve minus total cost. 
If multiple bidders drop at the clearing price, the group of bids that is accepted is chosen to 
maximize net value. 
5.6 Price formation 
Addressing market power in a firm energy market is essential. There is a strong incentive for 
existing resources to exercise market power. The reason is that the largest suppliers have 
significant market shares, existing resources have substantial sunk costs, and new resources are 
only a tiny fraction of the total. As a result, any of the largest suppliers could unilaterally set the 
clearing price by withholding supply. 
Long-term price signals are more stable and efficient if determined from competitive forces, 
rather than market power. We therefore propose a simple and direct method of addressing 
supplier market power. 
New firm energy bids are not mitigated in any way. A critical assumption is that the market 
for new resources is competitive. 
Existing resources can opt out of the market with either an opt-out bid or a retirement bid.  
An opt-out bid is used by a supplier to opt out of a single commitment year. If the price falls 
below the supplier’s opt-out bid, the supplier will not have any obligation during the 
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commitment year. The supplier can still participate in the energy spot market, but it will not 
receive any firm energy payment. Opt-out bids are not revealed during the auction. Moreover, 
opt-out bids cannot impact the price for existing supply. Opt-out bids may be rejected for 
reliability reasons, in which case the supplier gets a reliability must run payment. 
A retirement bid is a permanent opt out of the firm energy market. Retirement bids are 
submitted four weeks before the start of the auction. Accepted retirements are excluded from any 
future firm energy payments. Retirements may be rejected for reliability reasons, but only if the 
reliability problem cannot be resolved during the planning period with alternative actions, such 
as transmission upgrades or new resources. Retirements are posted as soon as they are accepted. 
Retirements are replaced with new resources in the auction. They are represented as a shift to the 
right in the demand curve for all prices below the retirement bid. 
With this approach to market power new resources almost always set the price. The demand 
curve sets the price in surplus years in which new entry is not needed. Retirements occasionally 
set the price. Other than retirements, existing resources never impact the price. 
Accepted opt-out bids are replaced with new resources as follows. First the auction is run 
ignoring the opt-out bids, and the clearing price is set as above. This is the clearing price for all 
existing resources. Then we replace the accepted opt-out bids by marching up the supply curve 
revealed in the clock auction until all the opt-out bids are replaced, with the exception that we 
stop replacing opt-out bids if it would entail a price increase of more than 30% from the original 
clearing price. Any additional replacements occur in the first reconfiguration auction. 
All new resources receive this higher price. However, existing resources receive the original 
clearing price.  
5.6.1 Repower bids 
Repower bids are intended to allow an existing supplier to replace one or more old units at 
an existing site with new units. The bid is a combination of a retirement of the old unit together 
with the entry of the new unit. There are two possible outcomes depending on whether the 
repower bid is accepted. If the repower bid is accepted, then the old unit retires and the new unit 
is added. If the repower bid is rejected, then nothing changes—the old unit continues to supply 
firm energy as before. 
Repower bids raise an important issue. Replacements take time, and hence require the old 
unit to be down for a period of time. The required downtime depends on the size of the 
replacement and the configuration of the site. There are two typical cases. 
Case 1: Quick switchover. If it is possible to build the new unit adjacent to the old unit, then 
the downtime could be limited to a few months. In this case, the downtime would be handled 
well through the monthly market. The supplier would simply buy in the monthly market the extra 
firm energy needed, and would likely schedule the downtime in the low-load months.  
Case 2: Extended down time. If the new unit needs to be at the same physical location as the 
old unit, then the downtime could be much more than a year. This is problematic, since the 
retirement would occur before the replacement is online. In this case, the supplier places a 
retirement one or more years ahead of the replacement unit’s new entry bid. The supplier is 
unable to couple the retirement and the new resource bid. The repowering would be done only if 
the supplier felt it profitable to introduce the replacement. For example, suppose a replacement 
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requires two years of downtime of the old unit. The replacement can be operational in 2013, but 
only if the existing unit is down in 2011 and 2012. Then in the 2007 auction for the 2011 
commitment year, the supplier submits a retirement bid. Then in 2009, the supplier submits a 
new resource bid for the replacement unit. Case 2 is not actually a repower bid, but rather a 
sequence of a retirement bid and a new resource bid. 
We now return to case 1 in which the downtime is less than one year. Then the replacement 
is effectively instantaneous, and any downtime is managed by the supplier using the monthly 
balancing market. The repower bid still needs to be submitted at the time of the retirement bids. 
However, the repower bid, like a new resource bid, is eligible to set the price. The only 
restriction is that the  new unit must be at least as large in firm energy as the old unit. 
As an example, suppose a 200 MW unit is replaced by a 300 MW unit. The new unit is sited 
adjacent to the old unit, so the downtime is limited to four months and this is scheduled in the 
wet season. The supplier submits a repower bid during qualification, which specifies the price of 
$8 for the 300 MW unit. At the bid price of $8, the aggregate supply curve has a horizontal step 
of 300 MW (to the right) and the demand curve has a horizontal step of 200 MW (to the left), 
indicating that the repower bid will be accepted for prices greater than $8 and rejected for prices 
below $8. The net impact is a 100 MW addition to supply at prices above $8. The repower bid is 
eligible to set the price. 
5.7 Performance incentives 
The performance incentive comes primarily from the energy spot price. This is not changed 
by the call option hedge. The hedge assures that normal performance will receive the normal 
reward in wet and dry periods alike. Every extra MWh of energy is rewarded the same with or 
without the hedge. Hedged resources still face the energy spot price at all times. Those that 
perform better receive more; those that perform worse receive less. The amount more and the 
amount less are determined from the energy spot price.  
A major benefit of the hedge is that it removes market power in the spot energy market 
during times of scarcity. Also since load is fully hedged from high spot prices, it is possible to 
increase the price cap well beyond the current cap. This can be done without fear that it will 
destabilize the spot market. Rather, raising the price cap will make the spot market perform 
better by reducing the importance of the non-market response to scarcity: rationing, reservoir 
limits, and force majeure clauses. Only by raising the price cap can we expect demand response 
mechanisms to be developed. 
An additional incentive to perform is the impact on the certified firm energy a unit is able to 
bid in the auction. Future certification is based on expected performance, and this measure 
responds to historical performance. Under-performing units are downgraded, and over-
performing units are upgraded. The difficulty, especially for hydro resources, is that the 
resources ability to provide firm energy in dry periods is only rarely tested.  
5.8 Fail-safe mechanism 
It is important that the auction have protections in case the auction fails from either 
inadequate supply or insufficient competition. 
Inadequate supply occurs if, at the starting price, there is insufficient supply of firm energy. 
In this case, new resources are paid the starting price. Existing resources are paid 1.1 CONE. 
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Note that this rule does not discourage new projects. New projects are rewarded handsomely. 
This reward should encourage the market to provide more new projects in the next auction. 
A second, less severe, failure is insufficient competition. Insufficient competition occurs if 
(1) existing resources, less retirements, is less than demand at the starting price, and (2) at the 
starting price, the firm energy bid exceeds the demand but there is less than 4% excess, or a 
single supplier’s new resources are pivotal (i.e., the supplier can unilaterally push the price to 2 
CONE by withholding its new projects).  
An additional requirement is needed to assure enough competition comes from smaller 
players. Insufficient competition also occurs if at qualification, the quantity of new projects from 
small players—those with less than 15% maximum firm-energy market share—is less than 50% 
of the required new firm energy. 
In the case of insufficient competition, the auction is still conducted. New resources are paid 
the clearing price. Existing resources are paid the smaller of the clearing price and 1.1 CONE. 
Again, this rule does not discourage new projects. 
An auction with neither inadequate supply or insufficient competition is a competitive 
auction. 
5.9 Secondary market 
Given that the auction occurs so far in advance, it is quite likely that circumstances will 
change for one or more suppliers. A supplier may find that its new project is proceeding ahead of 
schedule and the supplier will be ready to supply one year ahead of time; similarly, the supplier’s 
project may fall behind schedule, taking an extra year to complete. Also the forecast firm energy 
target may need revision due to load increasing faster or slower than expected. To accommodate 
these changes, we propose that a reconfiguration auction be held for every year following the 
primary auction until the commitment year is reached.  
The reconfiguration auctions take place at the same time as the primary auction. For 
example, if the primary auction is held 4 years ahead, then reconfiguration auctions are held for 
3, 2, 1, and 0 years ahead. In the reconfiguration auction, suppliers submit bids and asks to 
balance their positions (the reconfiguration auction could also include dispatchable load). 
The reconfiguration auction is a standard sealed-bid clearing-price auction. Suppliers 
simultaneously submit bids and asks, and the clearing price is determined. The demand curve is 
the same as in the primary auction, netting out firm energy already purchased and updating the 
firm energy target in light of new information. There is no bid mitigation. 
A final centralized opportunity to trade is a monthly spot exchange during the commitment 
year. This exchange has monthly simultaneous clearing, using a standard sealed-bid clearing-
price auction. This is just like the reconfiguration auctions, but the product is monthly, rather 
than yearly. Suppliers buy/sell to balance positions. Again the demand curve is the same as in the 
primary auction, but with an updated target. 
Suppliers can also engage in bilateral contracts as they see fit, provided both the physical 
and financial requirements of the product are maintained. 
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5.10 Transition 
Because of the long planning period, it is necessary to have a transition period in which the 
firm energy price is set administratively for the years 2007 to 2010. The schedule of auctions 



















Administrative Pricing for New and Existing Based on CONE
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The first auction held in November 2007 for 2011 commitment has a 3-year planning period. 
The planning period increases by six months with each successive auction until it reaches its 
permanent level of four years. To reduce risk in early years when the planning period is short, 
the firm energy payment for existing resources has a tighter floor and ceiling. The floor and 
ceiling for existing resources increases following each of the first four competitive auctions, as 
shown below. 
Transition 0 1 2 3 4
Ceiling = CONE × 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Floor = CONE × 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
Number of competitive auctions
Ceiling and Floor for Existing Suppliers in Early Years
 
During the three transition years, the firm energy product includes the financial call option. 
The administrative firm energy price includes a premium for the cost of the energy option. This 
cost can be estimated from historical data as well as forecasts. 
With this approach, existing energy contracts would be modified to account for the fact that 
the call option provides the price coverage from the scarcity price up. Fortunately, this 
modification is simple: the same premium is subtracted from the contract price as is added to the 
firm energy price, since prices above the scarcity price are now covered by the firm energy 
payment, not the contract. Alternatively, if load is fully contracted for the commitment years, 
then the contracts can stay the same, and the call option can be part of the contract. 
The figure below shows how firm energy is procured, recognizing load growth, assuming 
that all new supply selects a twenty-year commitment period. Notice that roughly the same 
quantity is auctioned each year for the first twenty years, despite the load growth. After the first 



















Nov   Jun   Nov   Nov Nov
2007 2007 2008 2009 2010  
6 Accommodating scarcity of both firm energy and capacity 
Ever electricity market requires sufficient capacity and energy to reliably satisfy load. We 
focus on firm energy—the ability to generate electricity in dry periods—because that is the 
reliability constraint that is currently binding in Colombia. Today there is roughly 13 GW of 
capacity to service the annual peak of about 8 GW. There is a 5 GW or 62% surplus of capacity. 
Given this surplus, it is clear that the market price for capacity is zero. Firm energy is the scarce 
resource, and that is what consumers should pay for. In contrast, in the electricity markets in the 
thermal-dominated U.S. markets, the reliability constraint is having enough capacity to handle 
the annual peak, so the focus there is on capacity. 
Over a period of decades, it may be that the optimal mix of plants in Colombia will change 
in such a way that capacity becomes a binding constraint. It would be nice if the market could 
handle such an evolution. As it turns out accommodating scarcity of both firm energy and 
capacity is easily accomplished within the framework of the current design. For completeness, 
we sketch the approach. We do not believe at this time that it is necessary to introduce the two-
product market, although doing so would not add any significant transaction costs, nor change 
market outcomes until capacity becomes scarce. Thus, the two-product market could be 
introduced immediately, or later, if and when it becomes plausible that the capacity constraint 
could begin binding. 
The extension is simple. The only change is introducing a second product, capacity. As 
before suppliers offer resources and each resource is a package of both firm energy and capacity. 
The market identifies the collection of resources that satisfy both the firm energy and capacity 
constraints. This is done in the descending clock auction as before, but now there are two 
products and so two prices. In each round, the auctioneer names a pair of prices (pE, pC), a price 
for firm energy and a price for capacity. Each supplier then decides whether, given the pair of 
prices, the supplier wishes to offer its resource. The auctioneer then determines the aggregate 
supply of both firm energy and capacity. If there is excess supply of a product, the auctioneer 
reduces its price, unless the price is already zero. This process continues until there is no longer 
excess supply of any product with a positive price. The auctioneer’s goal in adjusting prices is to 
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find the market equilibrium where supply and demand balance for all products with positive 
prices. 
As before, the auctioneer uses intraround bidding, so actually offers two price pairs, a start-
of-round price pair, and a lower end-of-round price pair. The auctioneer is effectively asking, 
“As prices fall from the start-of-round price pair to the end-of-round price pair, is there any point 
at which you would no longer wish to offer your resource?” This question is asked each round 
until a price pair is found that balances the market. 
In today’s market, the auctioneer would know that capacity will be in surplus, even at a zero 
price, and so the auctioneer would quickly let the capacity price fall to zero. This is why the two-
product market outcome would be the same as in the single-product market. Once the capacity 
price is zero, all that matters to the supplier is the price of firm energy. 
However, with a substantially different mix of resources and a different load curve, it might 
be that both products would clear with a positive price. The supplier is then paid for both firm 
energy and capacity. This, however, is an unusual case. Since resources are a package of both 
firm energy and capacity, it is much more common that in order to satisfy both reliability 
constraints, one of the constraints is in surplus. Hence, one of the two products has a zero price 
in most markets. 
In general, the mechanics of market clearing when suppliers offer a package of products is 
complex. The auction then is a combinatorial auction. There are a variety of methods for 
handling these package bids (Cramton et al. 2006). The most practical in this context is the 
clock-proxy auction, which is a particular type of clock auction that uses package bids (Ausubel 
et al. 2006). 
7 Common misunderstandings 
In this final section, we address a number of common misunderstandings about the proposed 
firm energy market. 
7.1 Approach is not used elsewhere 
This proposal integrates a number of ideas used in recent capacity market designs. For 
example, a similar approach was adopted in New England, which is a 32 GW system, in March 
2006. The approach was approved by FERC without modification in June 2006. It is currently 
being implemented. There are certainly differences between the New England capacity market 
and this proposal. Most importantly, New England’s reliability constraint is having enough 
capacity (rather than firm energy) to serve the peak hour in the year. A second difference is the 
New England market addresses market power by existing suppliers in a more complex and less 
effective manner. In other respects the approaches are quite similar. 
All the major elements of the proposal are commonly used in markets around the world. Call 
options are used everywhere. The clock auction format described here has been used for many 
years in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, Hungary, and 
Denmark for the sale and purchase of products worth in excess of US$10 billion. 
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7.2 Call option increases risk 
Some parties have asserted that the call option increases risk. They argue that price coverage 
should be accomplished through forward energy contracts, rather than with call options, which 
impose large risks on suppliers. It is easy to see that this argument is flawed from the figure 
below. A forward energy contract for full price coverage is mathematically identical to a forward 
energy contract covering prices up to the scarcity price plus a call option covering prices above 
the scarcity price. Hence, it is not possible for the forward energy contract approach to involve 
















One question, then, is what is the advantage of the mandatory call option relative to simply 
letting price coverage come from full forward energy contracts. One advantage of the mandatory 
call option is that it stops the vicious cycle involving market power and risk. If a supplier sells 
complete call option coverage, this eliminates its market power. Hence it would only do this, if it 
is paid for its market power. But this is just an exercise of market power in the forward market. 
The result is that forward coverage is much less then it should be resulting in both too much 
market power and too much risk. Requiring the hedge eliminates this vicious cycle. This is 
possible because suppliers have a strong incentive to participate in the firm energy market, and 
they will willingly give up their market power in the energy market to gain this opportunity. 
Thus, the mandatory call option mitigates market power in the forward energy market, reducing 
costs and improving the efficiency of the energy market. 
Another argument that the call option is very risky looks at distribution of cash flows 
associated with the call option and asserts that a seller of such a financial call option would have 
to charge a substantial risk premium. The problem with this analysis is that it assumes that the 
seller of the financial call option is unhedged. In that case, the call option is indeed risky. 
However, suppliers under this proposal have the generating unit to provide a physical hedge 
against this financial risk. Indeed, the only risk that the supplier faces is performance risk, and it 
is easily to show that performance risk is extremely low, given the performance characteristics of 
existing generators. Moreover, the whole point of a market approach is to improve performance 
and this cannot be accomplished if we eliminate performance risk. 
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7.3 Consumers will pay more 
Some have argued that consumers will pay more under this proposal, due to the substantial 
risk that suppliers face. Suppliers, it is argued, will need to be compensated for this additional 
risk. The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the market will increase supplier risk. 
In fact, the proposal reduces supplier risk. The only risk the supplier faces is performance risk, 
and this risk must be borne by the supplier in order to provide incentives for efficient operation 
and investment in resources. Indeed, the proposal minimizes risk while addressing market power 
and performance incentives. This means that consumers will pay less, not more. 
7.4 Spot energy price is not a reliable measure of scarcity 
Some have argued that the energy price is not a reliable measure of scarcity. High prices 
come from two sources: scarcity and market power. Given that the proposal addresses market 
power in the spot energy market with the mandatory call option, it must be that the high prices 
during scarcity events are indeed the result of scarcity.  
If the spot prices are still unreliable, then the market must have another flaw, other than 
market power. If this is the case, the best approach is not to abandon the spot energy price as a 
measure of scarcity, but rather to fix the flaw in the energy market. The proposal correctly 
focuses attention on the spot energy price.  
7.5 Approach is complex 
Effective firm energy markets are necessarily complex, because the market must solve some 
serious economic problems, such as investment in the correct mix of assets, inducing 
investments without damaging performance incentives, and market power by existing suppliers. 
In fact, this proposal avoids the complexity of having administrators decide the mix of resources 
using a non-transparent computer program as is proposed for PJM in the United States. It also 
avoids complex administrative performance incentives in favor of relying on the existing spot 
energy price. In general it uses clear and simple market-based methods. 
Other proposals based on prior capacity market designs may be simpler, but they are overly 
simple. For example, the prior capacity market in New England had two major flaws that led to 
its elimination: 
1. It did not adequately address performance incentives. As a result, it failed to induce right 
mix of resources, and failed to induce efficient operation of resources. The approach 
required greater command-and-control regulation of resources. 
2. It did not address market power, resulting in unstable an uneconomic capacity prices. 
This led to greater financial and political risk. It had higher contract costs due to the 
potential for exercising market power in the energy spot market, and higher energy spot 
prices and a less efficient energy spot market. 
The current proposal avoids these pitfalls by providing strong performance incentives and 
by simply and directly addressing market power in the firm energy market and in the energy spot 
market. 
 23
8 Simulation of the market demonstrates its risk-reducing benefits 
In a companion paper (Cramton et al. 2006), we present a simulation analysis of the 
proposed Colombian firm energy market. The main purpose of the simulation is to assess the risk 
to suppliers of participation in the market. We also are able to consider variations in the market 
design, and assess the impact of alternative auction parameters.  
Three simulation models are developed and analyzed. The first model (Model 1) uses 
historical price data from October 1995 through May 2006 to assess the performance risk of 
hypothetical thermal and hydro generating units. The second model (Model 2) uses historical 
price and operating data to assess performance risk of the actual generating units in Colombia 
over the same period. This analysis allows us to assess company risk. The third model (Model 3) 
differs from the other models in that it explicitly models the firm energy auction and investments 
going forward. Thus, the model is able to assess how the distribution of firm energy purchases 
differs from the firm energy target, and how this distribution depends on the firm energy demand 
curve. Model 3 also studies the investment decisions of suppliers, the impact of lumpy 
investments, and the impact of a higher scarcity price. 
Model 1: Simulated units facing historical prices 
An important output of Model 1 is the distribution of net firm energy payments for the 
hypothetical hydro and thermal units. A resource selling firm energy is selling a hedge for energy 
for prices above the scarcity price—whenever the spot energy price is above the scarcity price, 
the resource has an obligation to supply energy. The obligation is equivalent to a forward sale of 
energy at the scarcity price. Resources that over perform relative to the obligation are rewarded 
with the spot energy price for all extra output beyond their obligation; resources that under 
perform are penalized by effectively having to purchase the difference between the obligation 
and their output at the spot energy price. For taking on this obligation, resources receive a firm 
energy payment, which we assume here is equal to $12.85/MWh in January 2006 US dollars.7 
The net firm energy payment is the firm energy payment of $12.85 plus the reward for over 
performance, or minus the penalty for under performance. 
Our sample period includes one major dry period, which began August 1997 and ended 
April 1998. The dry period is characterized by frequent scarcity hours—hours in which the 
energy spot price is above the scarcity price of the hedge. There is a second, shorter period of 
high prices when the market first began, 20 November to 30 December 1995. 
In addition to the net firm energy payment, we calculate the Peak Energy Rent (PER). PER 
is the financial cost of the hedge—the difference between the spot price and the scarcity price for 
the obligation quantity in each scarcity hour. This cost is about 30 percent of the total firm 
energy payment. 
Model 1 determines the mean and standard deviation of the net firm energy payment for 
hypothetical generating units. We model performance risk for thermal units by assuming that the 
unit randomly fails and requires time to repair. Both the time until failure and the time to repair 
are exponentially distributed. The initial proposal for the market defined a unit’s obligation as its 
                                                 
7 In the actual market, the firm energy payment is determined in a competitive auction. In Models 1 and 2, we do not 
model the auction, and so assume a particular firm energy payment. All amounts are in January 2006 US dollars. 
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proportionate share of load in the hour. Thus, a unit selling 1% of the actual firm energy 
demanded has a 1% obligation in every scarcity hour. 
For our hypothetical thermal resource, we find that its net firm energy payment is roughly 
constant across all years. There is some variation in the net payment during the dry periods, but 
the variation is small relative to the mean. The variation is larger for resources with long repair 
times, since it is more likely that these units will either be running or not for extended periods. 
This increases risk. A second result is that the thermal units tend to under perform during dry 
periods. This is because they tend to produce at a constant rate, which results in a tendency to 
over perform during low-load hours and under perform during high-load hours. Since prices tend 
to be higher in high-load hours, this results in a slight penalty during the dry period. 
To better match a thermal unit’s output with its obligation, we consider a variation in which 
thermal resources have a constant obligation during scarcity hours and the hydro obligation 
follows the residual demand after subtracting the thermal obligation. We find that this variation 
does slightly increase a thermal resource’s mean return during dry periods, but it has almost no 
impact on risk. Nonetheless, the variation is desirable, since it improves the performance of the 
spot market in dry periods. A supplier has little incentive to exercise market power, since the 
supplier enters the spot market with a nearly balanced position. 
Performance risk of a hydro unit in Model 1 is modeled as a random draw of firm energy 
during dry periods. The hydro unit sells its expected firm energy during a dry period, but its 
actual firm energy may be more or less than is sold. Not surprisingly, the variation in the hydro 
unit’s net firm energy payment is directly related to this variation in its actual firm energy. 
Another result is that a hydro unit tends to over perform during dry periods. This is because the 
hydro unit has limited water and it rationally uses this water in the highest-priced hours. As a 
result, the hydro unit tends to over perform during high-priced hours and under-perform during 
low-priced hours, and thus, it receives a reward on average.  
Model 2: Actual units facing historical prices and output decisions 
One limitation of Model 1 for evaluating risk is that it ignores the reality that suppliers 
typically own a portfolio of plants. Indeed suppliers often invest in portfolios of plants in part to 
reduce risk. In Model 2, we calculate the net firm energy payment for each existing generator, 
assuming the firm energy market was in place since October 1995. We use the unit’s actual 
output in each hour. Each unit sells the quantity of firm energy specified in the preliminary firm 
energy numbers. For hydro units we calculate the net firm energy payment for both the reference 
quantity and the maximum quantity. The net firm energy payment includes all profits for prices 
above the scarcity price. 
As was the case with our hypothetical units in Model 1, hydro units tend to over perform 
during dry periods and thermal units tend to under perform. However, because of the tendency 
for companies to hold diversified plant portfolios, the net firm energy payment is nearly constant 
across years for most companies.  
Model 2 demonstrates how the hedge reduces supplier risk. Suppliers forfeit peak energy 
rents during dry periods for a higher constant payment that is received in all years. This stabilizes 
profits across wet and dry periods, and thereby reduces risk. Suppliers face some performance 
risk, but this risk is reduced when the supplier owns a diversified portfolio of generating units, as 
is common. 
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Model 3: Full simulation of investment decisions going forward 
Model 3 models the firm energy market going forward and thus the investment decisions of 
companies. There are two main inputs of Model 3. One is the set of existing resources and their 
preliminary firm energy numbers as updated in CREG resolution 071. The second is the 
hydrology output data for each of the hydro resources. We use each of the 100 ten-year series to 
simulate hydro output over 1000 years. We simulate the firm energy market over 1000 years 
(actually 50 twenty-year simulations) with benchmark parameter values. This analysis supports 
the risk analysis of Models 1 and 2. In addition, we are able to 1) determine how the distribution 
of firm energy purchases differs from the firm energy target, 2) determine the impact of lumpy 
investments, and 3) determine the impact of a higher scarcity price. We then consider two 
alternatives to the benchmark scenario. In the first alternative we double the slope of the firm 
energy demand curve. In the second alternative we double the price elasticity of demand during 
scarcity periods. 
The findings are as follows.  
• Lumpy investment means that few new units are added each year. Indeed, in 27% of the 
years no new entry occurs. (This is an overestimate to the extent that the size of winning 
projects reflect the actual need in the year.) 
• Lumpy investments cause a negative bias in profits, since the surplus causes a reduction in 
energy rents. Bidders would need to take into account. 
• The mandatory hedge is remarkably successful in reducing risk. In the benchmark case, the 
hedge reduces aggregate profit risk by a factor of 7. More importantly, the hedge reduces 
company risk by a factor of 4.5 in the benchmark case. Even when we assume a high level of 
demand response so that prices remain low during scarcity periods and there is less profit risk 
to start with, the hedge reduces company risk by 55%. 
• A higher scarcity price increases risk. Increasing the scarcity price shifts the profit 
distribution toward the no hedge case (a scarcity price of infinity). This results in a large 
increase in energy rent risk and a small decrease in hedge payment risk. The overall impact is 
a large increase in profit risk. 
Taken together, the simulation results demonstrate the risk reducing benefits of the firm 
energy market. Provided there is competitive new entry in response to load growth, the firm 
energy market should work well at coordinating investment in new supply, while minimizing 
supplier and consumer risks. 
9 Conclusion 
The firm energy market proposed here represents the current best-practice in electricity 
market design. Early capacity markets suffered from serious flaws that ultimately led to their 
elimination or replacement. The design proposed here corrects each of the earlier flaws. In 
particular, 
1. The product is well defined as a physically-backed call option on energy. The 
physical requirement assures reliability. The call option improves the performance of 
the spot energy market in times of scarcity and reduces supplier risk. 
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2. New entry is coordinated by holding the auction well in advance of the commitment 
period. This mitigates the boom-bust cycle that is common in electricity markets. 
More importantly, it allows the firm energy price to be more directly tied to the cost 
of new entry. 
3. Strong performance incentives are maintained from the spot energy price. Additional 
incentives come from the link, especially for thermal resources, between historical 
performance and the level of firm energy certification. 
4. Price formation is supported by eliminating the ability of existing suppliers to 
exercise market power in the firm energy market. In addition, the clock auction 
format is used to encourage price discovery and improve the efficiency of the auction 
outcome. 
A successful firm energy market depends on more than good design. First, the firm energy 
market has at its foundation the spot energy market. It is important that the spot energy market 
send reliable price signals. Second, the firm energy market relies on competitive entry; hence, 
entry barriers must be kept to a minimum. And finally, the firm energy market depends on long-
run price expectations; thus, it is important that investors have faith in the stability of the market 
over the long run. 
References 
Ausubel, Lawrence M., Peter Cramton, and Paul Milgrom (2006), “The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical 
Combinatorial Auction Design,” in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial 
Auctions, Chapter 5, 115-138, MIT Press. 
Bidwell, Miles (2005), “Reliability Options,” Electricity Journal, June. 
Carlos, Vazquez, Michel River, and Ignacio Perez Arriaga (2002), “A market approach to long-term security of 
supply,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 17 (2): 349-357. 
Chao, Hung-po and Robert Wison (2004), “Resource Adequacy and Market Power Mitigation via Option 
Contracts,” EPRI, Palo Alto, CA. 
Cramton, Peter, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (2006), Combinatorial Auctions, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Cramton, Peter and Steven Stoft (2006), “The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity,” 
white paper for the California Electricity Oversight Board. 
Cramton, Peter, Steven Stoft, and Jeffrey West (2006), “Simulation of the Colombian Firm Energy Market,” white 
paper, Criterion Auctions. 
Oren, Shmuel S. (2005), “Generation Adequacy via Call Option Obligations: Safe Passage to the Promised Land,” 
Electricity Journal, November. 
